Papers

Regulation, self-regulation, market regulation and the public sphere

Pedro Silva¹
psilva@sfsu.edu

16 October 2006

1 Political economy and the public sphere

In The international commercialization of broadcasting, [8] explains the process of exporting the American model of the media into the rest of the world. Simply put, the problem is one of geometric proportions: the advertisement-based revenue model first tested with the radio and later on put into full practice with television implies a commoditization of the media, which in turn puts the strain on the consumer-demand outlet. In other words, expansion is the key to ensuring continuing growth of revenue. And since growth of revenue is the legitimate end of an economic value system, the internationalization of commercial broadcasting was inevitable.

But if the rest of the world did not follow commercial broadcasting initially, what were its effects on their model? In fact, what was their model?

[6] first proposed the public sphere concept, meaning "first of all a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion is formed [with] access guaranteed to all citizens" (p. 49). [4], however, explained its dynamics with the media: he opposes the liberal free press theory to the public service model. The liberal ideal, he argues, is undercut by conditions of oligopoly created by the market; and political communication is manipulated by private ownership. Furthermore, he sees a contradiction between market-driven economic and social political value systems: the individual is a producer-consumer unit in one, with profit being the main concern; in the other, however, the individual is a responsible citizen, and the public good is the legitimate end. The public service model attempts to insulate itself from state control but disregards political control and economic social relations, while assuming political social relations.

[8] demonstrates how the European public service broadcasting model was undermined by economic forces at work. He is not, however, without a bias: the perspective of cultural imperialism practiced by the USA comes through his work. Expectedly, the word bourgeois and its marxist connotations is used frequently.

Slightly out of fashion nowadays, cultural imperialism has been progressively been substituted by theories of globalization first, and currently of American cultural supremacy [2]. Chalaby argues that this cultural supremacy has subsisted over the years not because of structuralist reasons, as [8] proposes, but due to American broadcasters's "understanding and adaptation to European cultures (...) They have adopted a regional strategy and adapted their organizational structure to the international nature of the (...) market" (p. 48). What [2] fails to explain is how his model addresses the disappearance of the public sphere. This is obviously not at all what [6] had in mind. Unless we can consider current American cultural supremacy as a liberal free press model of the public sphere. Some have proposed that a drastic increase of information and communication possibilities would create an information-based society where the citizen could again regain its role of responsible political actor.

[3], however, considers such arguments invalid, due to the "assumption that new technologies will increase general access to information and open up new possibilities of two-way communication" (p. 244). This looks to me as a striking example of why a "point can be made as to the importance of technical knowledge in discussing matters of non-technical significance, but relating to technology [10,p. 5]. The Internet has obviously fulfilled, or has the potential to fulfil, whatever expectations proponents of a liberal free press theory had in the first place. The question that remains to be asked is: has the role of the consumer been intertwined with that of the political citizen, capable and interested of acting not in self-interest but to the benefit of the public good?

2 Regulatory models

2.1 The American case: market regulation

I purposefully frame American regulatory policy in the media generally and in broadcasting and film production in particular for the following reasons:

convenience of argument
to limit the scope of the discussion
to use [2]'s and [8]'s frameworks for analyzing different regulatory models and how they interact at the international level, particularly in Europe.

While American broadcasting has been somewhat self-regulated in the past, when analyzed under the public sphere notion it is clear that, because the business model was commercial from its inception, when it finally interacted with Europe's public service model, it did so virtually unregulated: market regulation is an euphemism here.

Elaborating, two self-regulating processes emerge from this analysis: the first is defined by professional deontological codes of ethics which, although not constituting traditional self-regulation, can be argued to have the same general purpose: to balance the economic with the political, or public sphere. These codes have derived from practical utility, serving to shield professionals from public scrutiny:

[They] seek publicly-appealing moral norms to protect them from criticism, embarrassment, or lawsuits, and to give them guidance in their work to prevent practices that would provoke criticism [and more important] to endow their occupation with an identity they can count as worthy [9,p. 165].

This is clearer when seen under [7]'s definition of norm:

By norm I mean a decentralized behavioral standard that individuals feel obligated to follow, and generally do follow, for the esteem reasons described above, or because the obligation is internalized, or both. Without internalizations, one obeys the norm to avoid external sanctions made possible by the desire for esteem (...) After internalization, there is yet another cost to violating a norm: guilt (p. 381).

If Schudson is right and professional codes are an attempt at preserving esteem, then do they constitute real self-regulation in light of its announced purpose of balancing economic and politic value systems in society? To the extent that media professionals can not be punished by their actions, will they not act in a market-driven way? I will come back to this further ahead.

The second self-regulating process in the USA is the para-legalistic kind, such as National Association of Broadcasters's (NAB) code for radio (1929) and television (1951), and subsequent efforts such as the Children's Advertising Review Unit, the Distilled Spirits Council of the United States's (DISCUS) code of good practice, and the Press Councils [1]. Various authors have addressed the limitations of the NAB code. Besides frequent challenges for constitutionality and consequent amendments, the effective enforcement of the code was generally curbed by the extent of subscribership and lack of monitoring (pp. 725-734). And this is at the national level.

Internationally, American production companies go unchecked. Their practices of adapting contents to local differences while retaining formula-type productions served as a vehicle for US supremacy during, for instance, the upcoming of the sound film during the late 1920s and early 1930s, when Europe was an even playing field [5]. This is continued today with television, mainly cable, companies [2,p. 47]. Their position was achieved at the expense of public service broadcasters, through paramount pressure, often directly, but usually indirectly. This pressure took the form of support to pirate radio stations which challenged European public stations; sometimes this support went to neighboring countries's stations, already converted to the commercial model [8].

These arguments, I believe, argue for the American de-regulation of its media, particularly at the broadcasting, cable, and film production level.

2.2 The European case: from a public service regulatory model to self-regulation to market (de)regulation

There is little doubt that, traditionally, European states have been inclined to strongly regulate its media. [6], we have seen, framed this initiative within the public sphere model; [8] and [5] emphasized the economic relations between the United States and Europe, and consequently focused on what they called American cultural imperialism; [2] also stressed the importance of the economic factors, but readjusted the underlying theory into American cultural supremacy, as opposed to imperialism, the difference presumably being one of effect: where in imperialism American companies absorbed regional diversity and substituted it for their product, in cultural supremacy local differences are taken into consideration, and preserved where such practice is economically rational -but still constrained, of course, to typical American production formulas. In any case, the three agree on one thing: Europe's protectionist efforts through strong regulation of its markets was ineffective. Be it due to American patent dominance, as in the case of Gomery's argument, or Europe's lack of strategic vision as Chalaby points out, Europe's public service broadcasting was indeed changed first into a self-regulating industry, upon which the French, British, and Swiss stations, for example, were subjected to unregulated competition from pirate broadcasters financed in many cases by American companies [8,p. 198]; in other cases, cartelization happened: media convergence and conglomeration contributing to, or perhaps being a function of, the phenomenon. This, [1,p. 719] argues, is a major factor for an unsuccessful use of self-regulation, which may explain the current state of Europe's once very public-oriented broadcasters, and now barely recognizable from their commercial counterparts, even where state participation still occurs (I am particularly familiar with the Portuguese case, RTP, where public funding still supports what now is a largely commercial enterprize, with major revenue coming from advertisements). Conglomeration may actually explain the inefficiency of market quotas, tariffs, and other protectionist mechanisms. When the multinational is the rule, not the exception, how can customs-based protectionism work? The public service model was mined from within, and, with it, the public sphere is dead.

3 The information society as the new public sphere

I've argued before that there is another medium, or rather media, which has endless possibilities in reviving the public sphere and, with it, active citizenry and political responsibility. Consider the following premises:

The public sphere is a desirable concept, in that it promotes responsible and active political engagement
Market (de)regularization is also something to strive for, because it generates economic growth
The two previous items are the necessary conditions for sustained development of society
The traditional public service or liberal free press model of the public sphere and market (de)regularization are mutually exclusive [4]
[3] was wrong, and the Internet-supported information society we live in indeed ïncrease[s] general access to information and open[s] up new possibilities of two-way communication" (p. 244), such that "the drastic increase of information and communication possibilities [has] create[d] an information-based society where the citizen [can] regain its role of responsible political actor"
The Internet's role as the new public sphere depends on its separation from the commercial model associated with (de)regularization

If these are true, then my position in terms of regulatory stance over the media in general, and how they relate to the public in particular would have to be this: since the public sphere has found another platform on which to rest upon, its weight does not come into consideration in deciding how to regulate traditional media. It is irrelevant whether these offer something closely resembling public service. They should not be funded in any way by the public; however they should also not be regulated as to their usefulness to a political value system. The informational aspects of traditional media should from now on be disregarded, and instead have entertainment-based values put in their place. Nothing much would change, I speculate. One minor detail: traditional media's relation with the Internet should be highly regulated, as to prevent another ïnternational commercialization of broadcasting", this time within the Internet fabric. Obviously, it might be too late for that, as issues of "Net Neutrality" already have started cropping up. We are on the verge of losing yet another form of public sphere. Hence my emphasis on strict regulating, if not the Internet itself (that is out of the scope of my argument), then the way the media are involved with it. I won't focus on specific measures of regulation on the Internet for the development of the public sphere concept. Instead, I will look at what seems to me to be a fundamental interfacing point for media and the web: Internet access. Efficacy and equality should be preserved at all cost. The monopolies we currently observe all over the USA and Europe are a sign things might change abruptly. With that in mind, I would propose that Internet access not be commoditized, and instead state-controlled. In that way, media companies would not be in a position of conflict, and would compete equally with other non-media presences: they would be just another player. As it is, "Net Neutrality" is an issue worth fearing, when it should not even come into factor.

I do not have a definite answer to the problem: market (de)regulation is in direct contradiction with regulatory policy, in that it opposes the political with the economic, as [4] has shown. Both have different value systems and their ultimate goals are thereby defined in opposition. On the other hand, self-regulation of a non-public enterprize seems doomed to fail not matter what. Despite all arguments in favor and against presented in [1], one simple fact calls for attention: the internalization McAdams talks about as being fundamental for the existence of guilt and, therefore, the voluntary obedience to norms, simply does not happen in the economic value system, since its ultimate goal is the generation of profit. Unless, of course, a specific norm actually furthers that very particular interest, in which case it will be swiftly internalized and followed without question.

References

[1]: Angela J. Campbell. Self-regulation and the media. Federal Communications Law Journal, 51(3):711-771, 1999.
[2]: Jean K. Chalaby. American cultural primacy in a new media order: A european perspective. International Communications Gazette, 68(1):33-51, 2006.
[3]: Phillip Elliot. Intellectuals, the 'information society' and the disappearance of the public sphere. In P. Schlesinger and C. Sparks, editors, Media, culture and society, volume 4, pages 244-6. Academic Press, London, 1982.
[4]: Nicholas Garnham. The media and the public sphere. In P. Golding, G. Murdock, and P. Schlesinger, editors, Communicating politics, pages 45-53. Leicester University Press, 1986.
[5]: Douglas Gomery. Economic struggle and hollywood imperialism. In Elisabeth Weis and John Belton, editors, Film sound: Theory and practice, pages 26-36. Columbia University Press, New York, 1985.
[6]: Jurgen Habermas, Sarah Lennox, and Frank Lennox. The public sphere: An encyclopedia article. New German Critique, (3):49-55, Autumn 1974.
[7]: Richard H. McAdams. The origin, development, and regulation of norms. Michigan Law Review, 96(2):338-433, 1997.
[8]: Herbert I. Schiller. The international commercialization of broadcasting, pages 94-103. Beacon Press, Boston MA, 1971.
[9]: Michael Schudson. The objectivity norm in american journalism. Journalism, 2(2):149-170, 2001.
[10]: Pedro A. Silva. On the 'acoustical properties of ether' and radio, or paradoxes of neotechnics in communications research during the early-mid 1930s. Unpublished, September 2006.
[11]: Gaye Tuchman. Objectivity as strategic ritual: An examination of newsmen's notions of objectivity. The American Journal of Sociology, 77(4):660-679, 1972.

Footnotes:

¹Broadcast and Electronic Arts Department, San Francisco State University

File translated from T_EX by T_TH, version 3.77.
On 24 Apr 2007, 23:50.